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After the granting of citizenship to 300,000 immigrants from 
Bulgaria in 1989, Turkey has enacted visa regime changes con-
cerning more recent migrants from Bulgaria, who, according to 
the most recent modification, are only allowed to stay for 90 days 
within any six-month period. In this article, the authors demon-
strate that the broken lines of legality/illegality produced by 
these changing policies further entrench the sovereignty of the 
state through the "inclusive exclusion" of immigrants who are 
subject to the law but not subject in the law. The temporary le-
galization of Bulgarian immigrants to Turkey in return for vot-
ing in the Bulgarian elections reveals that the state extends its 
transnational political power by drawing and redrawing the bro-
ken lines of legality/illegality. We demonstrate not only the ways 
in which the migrant population from Bulgaria is managed but 
also the strategies deployed by the migrants themselves in the 
face of such sovereign acts. KEYWORDS: immigration, Turkey, Bul-
garia, visa policy, sovereignty 
It has been widely claimed that the accelerat ion and intensification of 
globalization, especially in conjunct ion with the neol iberal economic 
restructuring of the last few decades , poses chal lenges to nation-states 
no t only th rough t ransnat ional corpora t ions a n d in te rna t iona l polit-
ical bodies but also th rough the t ransnat ional ties migrants forge be-
yond national borders . 1 Nonetheless , as Bauman argues, " there seems 
to be an int imate kinship, mutua l condi t ion ing and reciprocal rein-
forcement between the globalization of all aspects of the economy 
•Department of Anthropology, Sabanci University, Istanbul, Turkey. E-mail: ayseparla 
@sabanciuniv.edu 
203 
2 0 4 Broken Lines of II/Legality and the Reproduction of State Sovereignty 
and the renewed emphasis on the territorial principle."2 The elective 
affinity between globalization and the territorial principle, or what 
others have more generally described as the continuing relevance of 
the nation-state,3 increasingly renders state borders and visa policies 
the sites of an asymmetric relationship between the sovereign state 
and immigrants who develop formal and informal strategies to ex-
pand spaces for maneuver, the limits of which are nonetheless still de-
marcated by the sovereign state. 
It has also been argued that the reproduction of state sovereignty 
often utilizes the temporariness of the legal status of immigrants.4 Ac-
cording to Calavita's primarily economic emphasis, the law system-
atically reproduces the irregularity of migrants in order to ensure a 
vulnerable and dispensable workforce. The sorting of people into cat-
egories of otherness no longer occurs on the basis of cultural or eth-
nic markers, but rather on their positioning in the global economy.5 
In a similar vein, King underlines that "illegality seems to be con-
structed in an illogical (but perhaps cynical) way by host societies which 
seem to be willing to exploit cheap migrant labor (and even be struc-
turally dependent upon it) yet at the same time to deny the legal and 
civic existence of migrants."6 Balibar, too, points to the reproduction 
of illegality despite the rhetoric of immigration control but places the 
emphasis on how illegality and discourses about illegality become the 
raison d'etre of the security apparatus.7 
Other scholars have stressed the systematic nature of this tempo-
rariness by utilizing Giorgio Agamben's notion of the state-of-excep-
tion to understand the conditions of refugees: Sovereign states make 
the ultimate decision to include or exclude primarily by wielding the 
power of separating the rights of the citizen from the rights of man.8 
For Agamben, the separation of rights of the citizen from the rights 
of man is consolidated through the "irrevocable unification of the 
principle of nativity and the principle of sovereignty" in the forma-
tion of the nation-state, resulting in the "inclusive exclusion" of bare 
life from the political life, or, of zoe from bios. As birth immediately be-
comes nation, the immigrant's subjecthood, irrespective of other af-
filiations, becomes homo sacer (bare life), which is not the subject in 
the law but subject to the law, suspended in a permanent state of ex-
ception.9 
In his incisive analysis of global visa regimes, Mark Salter under-
lines the need to supplement Agamben's notion of exception-to-the-
rule with Foucault's confessionary complex in order to recover the 
agency of the subject who enters a national territory. According to 
Salter, the specific decision for entry into the bios is not comprised of 
exhaustive regulations, as a stricter reading by Agamben would have 
it. Rather, the border-crosser can also resist the institutional and indi-
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vidual decision—as the arbitrary embodiment of authority in the per-
sona of the particular border official—to be included/excluded 
"through the confessionary representation of his/her bodily, eco-
nomic, and social information, which in turn is reconfigured by the 
receiving state in terms of health, wealth, and labor/leisure."10 Thus 
resistance is possible, but it is a resistance that is structured by the sov-
ereign. It is the particular embodiment of this resistance which Salter, 
inspired by Foucault, finds to be the key: "It is not simply that the in-
ternational population is managed, but that we come to manage our-
selves through the confessionary complex."11 
Inspired by Salter's juxtaposition of Agamben's emphasis on sov-
ereign authority with Foucault's biopolitics, this article seeks to ana-
lyze the role of constantly changing visa policies in the production of 
yet another case of temporariness, that of the post-1990s labor mi-
grants from Bulgaria to Turkey. We draw on Agamben in showing how 
these incessant changes repeatedly redefine the "threshold in life that 
distinguishes and separates what is inside from what is outside,"12 and 
we draw on Foucault's emphasis on power not (just) as the endless re-
sort that the state has to the state of exception but rather power as it 
operates in the routinized, everyday practices of migrants who come 
to manage their irregularity. 
Extending Salter's analysis, we also call attention to the fact that 
the bordering process and the moment of decision are not limited 
to the acts of border-crossing. Rather, the changing immigration 
policies reach beyond the border to shape the everyday experiences 
of the post-1990s Turkish immigrants from Bulgaria and their en-
counters with the state. Our research is thus firmly located in the 
anthropological approach to sovereignty, which, in the words of Das 
and Poole, "instead of privileging metaphysical forms of reasoning 
. . . focuses on the workings of the everyday."13 Based on eighteen 
months of ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Istanbul between 
January 2007 and July 2008, we unravel the impact of the incessant 
changes in the visa policies on the post-1990s Bulgarian Turkish im-
migrants' everyday lives. We conjure the traffic metaphor of "bro-
ken lines" to depict the ways in which the state continues to exclude 
the immigrants while ostensibly including them. Rather than the 
continuous lines that forbid crossing to the other side and restrict 
travel to the same lane, visa policies, as "instruments of exclusion," 
resemble the broken lines that allow one to cross over to the next 
lane and return as long as the traffic is not disrupted. The state lays 
down rules for immigrants by constituting the boundaries of legal-
ity/illegality not as continuous but broken lines. These rules not only 
define the legal lanes but more importantly determine the condi-
tions and strategies that make the legal lanes transpassable. In other 
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words, "inclusive exclusion" produces broken lines of regularity and 
legality, lines that the immigrants are constantly made to cross as 
subject to the law but not subject in the law. 
The reproduction of state power through this inclusive exclusion 
concerns both the economic and political power of the state. In terms 
of economic power, the more flexible visa regimes render, as we will 
show, the immigrant labor force increasingly vulnerable and thus rein-
force their dispensability according to the needs of the labor market.14 
In that, the Turkish state's move toward more flexible visa regimes 
partakes in the global trend of regularization programs elsewhere in 
Europe and the United States as dictated by the needs of the labor 
market. However, there is an additional, political component to these 
visa policies in the Turkish context that renders our analysis more 
specific, and that concerns the "ethnic" character of this particular 
migratory movement. The Turkish state instrumentalizes immigrant 
illegality for transnational political practices such as getting the im-
migrants to vote in the Bulgarian national elections in return for 
granting temporary residence permits. Keeping the immigrants in a 
permanent state of exception also consolidates the transnational po-
litical interests of the state through the instrumentalization of mi-
grants' ethnic affiliation. 
Immigration to Turkey Since the 1990s 
While Turkey used to be considered as a country of emigration orig-
ination rather than one of immigration destination, this has gradually 
been reversed as a consequence of the economic and political 
changes in the region.15 On the one hand transit migrants, especially 
from Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and African countries, increasingly 
arrive in Turkey illegally with the intention of migrating to a third 
country.16 On the other hand, large numbers of people from neigh-
boring countries, such as Iran, Iraq, Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, the 
Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Georgia, have started to enter the 
country through legal routes to work in the informal sector such as 
the suitcase trade17 and domestic work.18 Based on residence permits 
issued by the Directorate of General Security as the only direct evi-
dence on foreigners in the Turkish labor market, and on the number 
of legal entries from the neighboring countries as indirect evidence, 
Içduygu states that the estimated number of illegal workers would 
have been 150,000-200,000 for the year 2005. He also notes that 
some senior officials claim the presence of around "one million ille-
gal foreign workers" in Turkey.19 The occupational breakdown of this 
population without official papers shows women to be informally em-
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ployed primarily in domestic work and the entertainment sector and 
men in construction and agriculture.20 Meanwhile, the total figure 
for transit migrants who either entered or exited Turkey illegally be-
tween 1995 and 2006 stands at only 616,527,21 which might be taken 
as an indication of the cyclical nature of il/legal immigration that re-
sults neither in full illegality nor full regularization, but rather in sys-
tematic irregularity.22 
The recent upsurge in labor migration is viewed as the result of 
the demise of the Soviet Union and communism; transitions to neo-
liberal capitalism; and subsequent economic difficulties in these send-
ing countries.23 As for the pull factors, Içduygu identifies the following: 
Turkey's geographical proximity, the relative ease of crossing the bor-
der, low travel costs, low cost of living, and the existence of prior mi-
grant networks.24 One crucial additional pull factor has been the 
flexibilization of the Turkish visa policy. Since the end of the Cold 
War, there has been a significant decrease in control and an increase 
in commercial as well as private traffic in the region, with the Bulgar-
ian-Turkish border constituting the main transit path to Turkey.25 
More specifically, through a series of bilateral agreements and the in-
troduction of "sticker visas" for nationals of Iran, the former Soviet 
Union, and the Balkan countries, Turkish visa policy underwent a grad-
ual liberalization after 2001.26 The quantitative consequences of this 
liberalization are evident in the number of entries: In 2005 6.2 mil-
lion people from the Balkans and the post-Soviet world entered 
Turkey, while this figure for 1980 was less than 54,000.27 For immi-
grants from Bulgaria, too, the lifting of the visa requirement led to a 
near tripling of entries: from about 140,000 in 1996 and 380,000 in 
2000, to 1.3 million out of six million entries in 2004 from former So-
viet republics, and Balkan and Middle Eastern countries.28 
Harmonizing with the Schengen Visa Regime 
Besides the acceleration of neoliberal restructuring in the region and 
the concomitant liberalization of the Turkish visa regime, another sig-
nificant factor that influences both the nature and the management 
of the migrants from Bulgaria is the EU accession process. Throughout 
the 1990s and up until 2001, the Bulgaria-to-Turkey migrants needed 
tourist visas to enter Turkey, limiting the legal immigration of those 
seeking work. Nonetheless, it was still possible to acquire citizenship 
once a migrant succeeded in staying legally in Turkey for two years 
and renewed their residence permit regularly during that time. How-
ever, our respondents' narratives reveal that it became increasingly 
difficult in the latter 1990s to obtain a tourist visa to leave Bulgaria, 
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and that visas were usually granted to only one of the partners per 
family. This was not an official rule but the accounts of our infor-
mants suggest that it was practiced routinely. Given the increasing dif-
ficulty of getting tourist visas, people began to seek illegal routes to 
reach Turkey, either in search of jobs or to unite with a partner who 
had already migrated. We have observed that one out of every three 
respondents who migrated in the late 1990s either sought recourse to 
smuggling networks themselves or were aware of such a practice 
through the experience of a friend or a relative. 
In 2001 the Turkish government decided to lift the visa require-
ment for Bulgarian nationals. In this case, the Turkish government's 
decision regarding visa requirements had to take into account not only 
the relations between the two neighboring countries but also Turkish-
EU and Bulgarian-EU relations, with the two countries positioned as 
two distinct candidates. Bulgaria was initially included on the Schengen 
negative list that came into effect in September 1995. This was due to 
the EU concern about Bulgaria's lack of adequate security measures 
and the potential risk of illegal immigration originating from and tran-
siting through Bulgaria. In March 2001 the EU Council removed Bul-
garia from the negative list as a result of Bulgaria's attempts to adjust to 
the Schengen rules. Turkey, however, remained on the negative list. Ac-
cording to Joanna Apap et al., and contrary to the former strict visa pol-
icy to stop the economically motivated migration from Bulgaria, the EU 
decision to lift visa requirements for Bulgarian citizens became a major 
motive for the Turkish government's decision to lift the strict visa re-
quirement for Bulgarian nationals in June 2001.29 
From 2001 to May 2007, therefore, migrants from Bulgaria were 
allowed to stay in Turkey on visa waivers valid for three months. This 
new procedure also paved the way for legalization of those who had 
entered the country on a tourist visa in the late 1990s and had over-
stayed, as well as of those who had entered the country illegally 
through smugglers. As a result of this change, those who migrated as 
a family pursued the "residence permit for person accompanying a 
child studying in Turkey" (in Turkish, refakatçi izni), which does not 
grant the right to work. The majority of others who came as inde-
pendent migrants became circular migrants on visa waivers. 
In May 2007 another new visa agreement came into force as part 
of the ongoing harmonization with the Schengen visa regime. The 
former procedure that permitted Bulgarian Turks legal stay as tourists 
on visa waivers valid for three months was replaced by permission to 
stay for a maximum of 90 days of every six months. Reciprocally, Turk-
ish passport holders are subject to the same rule, and those who are 
transiting to the Schengen area with a proper visa are no longer re-
quired to get a Bulgarian visa.30 Ironically then, compared to the pre-
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vious regulation, the new visa agreement has created a more flexible 
visa regime for Turkish nationals and a stricter one for Bulgarian na-
tionals, including the Bulgarian labor migrants in Turkey. Therefore, 
from the point of view of Bulgarian nationals, harmonization with the 
Schengen visa regime changed the more permeable border between 
Bulgaria and Turkey to a stricter one while granting the right to free 
movement within the whole Schengen area for a maximum of ninety 
days of every six months. Thus, in legal terms, we can claim that the 
new procedure seems to equalize the conditions for migration from 
Bulgaria to EU countries and to Turkey. For the labor migrants from 
Bulgaria to Turkey, however, it has meant the stark choice between 
losing their jobs and lapsing once again into illegality. 
The Turks of Bulgaria Migrate to the "Homeland" 
So far we have acknowledged the significance of the acceleration of 
the neoliberal restructuring in the region and the concomitant liber-
alization of the Turkish visa policy and the mixed role of the EU ac-
cession process for the increasing number of migrants from Bulgaria. 
We now turn to another factor that is peculiar to the group under 
study and which has had a profound impact on the changing type and 
pattern of migration as well. This concerns the "ethnic" character of 
this particular migration flow. As scholars have pointed out, the man-
agement of the Turkish immigrants from Bulgaria has also to do with 
the particular history of the Turkish state's relationship to those 
groups officially considered as ethnic kin.31 
Historically the immigration of those who were officially be-
lieved to be the most assimilable to the construct of Turkishness was 
encouraged and welcomed by the founding fathers of the Turkish re-
public.32 Their goal was to create a sense of homogenous national 
identity out of an ethnically and culturally diverse country and the 
incorporation of desirable migrants was one strategy toward the re-
alization of this goal. As opposed to those who neither speak Turkish 
nor "belong to Turkish culture," among the groups seen as the most 
assimilable were past immigrants from the Caucasus and the Bal-
kans, who are ethnically Albanian, Bosnian, Circassian, Pomak, 
Roma, Tatar, and so on but who speak Turkish.33 The legal ground 
on which these groups were appropriated into the national body is 
the Turkish Settlement Law of 1934. Moreover, notwithstanding the 
dearth of regulations to put this law into action, the most recent ver-
sion of the Settlement Law, accepted in 2006, still purports to privi-
lege immigrants of "Turkish descent and culture" in terms of 
acquiring legal papers.34 
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The 1934 Settlement Law, which permitted and occasionally even 
encouraged the migration of those of Turkish ethnicity, facilitated 
several large migration waves on the part of the Turkish minority in 
Bulgaria, often designated, not unproblematically, as the "return" of 
ethnic kin back to their "homeland."35 The first wave occurred in 
1925, following the agreement signed by Bulgaria and Turkey allow-
ing voluntary resettlement; the second in 1950-1951, following the 
advent of communism and the collectivization of land in Bulgaria; 
and the third in 1968, by virtue of the treaty to unite separated fami-
lies.36 The last and most massive wave of immigration took place after 
the infamous assimilation campaign launched under the leadership 
of Todor Zhivkov and directed toward the Turkish and other minori-
ties in Bulgaria. More than 300,000 people migrated to Turkey in 
1989 fleeing state repression. However, nearly a third of these re-
turned soon after the regime change in Bulgaria in 1990 as the Cold 
War ended. Those who stayed in Turkey were granted Turkish citi-
zenship.37 
After the massive migration wave of 1989, people from Bulgaria 
were once again on the road to Turkey. But the Turkish authorities 
have taken an entirely different stance toward the "economic" migra-
tion of the Turkish immigrants, which became more frequent by the 
late 1990s. In contrast to the 1989 immigrants who received Turkish 
citizenship, the post-1990s migrants, who are technically entitled to 
the same privileges accorded by the status of "ethnic kin," are being 
subjected to constantly changing visa regimes. Why is it that a group 
of people who have historically occupied a privileged position as pre-
ferred migrants suddenly find themselves relegated to the status of 
"mere economic migrants?" 
As Erder and Kaska have stated, the economic, social, cultural, 
and historical differences among the sending countries of the former 
Soviet Union and the differences in their diplomatic relations with 
Turkey have resulted in different visa policies at the state level as well 
as in different attitudes toward the migrants at the societal level.38 
Notwithstanding this argument, we further claim that the differences 
do not solely derive from the specificities of a particular form of migra-
tion but rather from how the state positions itself vis-a-vis immigrants 
over time. In other words, the status of the immigrants are subject to 
change as long as the terms and conditions of migration are shaped 
and determined by the sovereign states that dictate who/how/why 
will be allowed to enter/ stay/leave a national territory. Therefore, we 
argue that both the policies and the attitudes toward any group of 
migrants are contextual and relational, and are constantly reshaped 
according to the political and economic needs of the state. More specif-
ically, despite being motivated with the same ultimate aim to sustain 
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and extend its realm of sovereignty, in comparison with its stance to-
ward earlier migrants from Bulgaria, the Turkish state takes an altered 
stance toward the post-1990s migrants by keeping them in a perma-
nent state of exception, by first including them through a more flexi-
ble visa regime in 2001 and then excluding them through the 
withdrawal in 2007 of their privileged right of entry vis-a-vis the other 
former Soviet Union countries. 
The immediate explanation for the above shift is that Turkey is 
simply adjusting its home affairs to changes in international affairs in 
accordance with the dictates of both the neoliberal policy of flexible 
visa regimes and the Schengen acquis. We argue, however, that be-
yond this seemingly obvious explanation, there are other dynamics 
that need to be uncovered. The formal visa regulations enacted by 
law are occasionally circumvented by the Turkish state through cir-
cular letters issued by the Ministry of the Interior. For example, al-
most simultaneously with the formal changes in the Schengen 
negative list in favor of Bulgaria and the general flexibilization of the 
Turkish visa regime in the year 2001, Turkey also released an 
"amnesty" for those migrants who had overstayed their visas but who 
were willing to vote in the 2001 Bulgarian general elections. The 
same strategy, which we explain in detail below, was reenacted in 2005 
and 2007, thus signaling the systematization of granting free resi-
dence permits in return for voting in the Bulgarian elections. As op-
posed to the former policies of welcoming "ethnic Turks" from the 
Balkans and thus maintaining the image of a "protective state" on the 
domestic and international scene, the Turkish state seems to have de-
veloped new strategies toward making use of the transnational ties of 
the Turkish minority in Bulgaria.39 
So far we have unraveled the economic, international, legal, and 
political dynamics that paved the way for a new migration pattern 
from Bulgaria to Turkey in the course of the 1990s. In the rest of the 
article we seek to demonstrate how such structural factors are being 
used by the Turkish state to reiterate its sovereignty and to extend it 
beyond territorial borders, but with an eye to understanding how im-
migrants respond to such sovereign acts. 
Portraits 
The data provided here is based on eighteen months of ethnographic 
fieldwork conducted from January 2007 to July 2008, although we also 
incorporate developments as late as March 2009 gleaned from ongo-
ing work in the field. Fieldwork was undertaken in several districts of 
Istanbul, ones that are densely populated by Turkish immigrants from 
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Bulgaria. The anthropological methods of participant observation, 
and semistructured and open-ended interviews were deployed to col-
lect the data. In order to provide the "thick description" integral to 
the anthropological method, relationships with the migrants who are 
the subjects of the study were established over multiple encounters, 
which included visits to their homes, participation in their social ac-
tivities, and accompanying them to the association where they seek 
legal advice. Interviews and participant observation were also con-
ducted at the most established migrant association in Istanbul with 
the association's president and newspaper editor. Finally, a cross-bor-
der ethnographic trip to Bulgaria was undertaken in September 
2007, following the most recent change in visa policy. The trip was un-
dertaken by bus, the most common mode of transportation used by 
the migrants themselves. The journey across the Bulgarian-Turkish 
border made possible the observation of the various arbitrary proce-
dures practiced at the border as well as migrants' responses to these 
practices. Our micro-level ethnographic analysis, which engages lived 
experiences across a variety of contexts ranging from the private 
spaces of the home to the public spaces of travel to the institutional 
spaces of the association, resonates with the call of Adrian Favell and 
others for capturing the "human face of migration." 
Nurcihan 
A mother of two children and a chemist by profession, Nurcihan 
Hanim has been working as a live-out domestic worker in Istanbul for 
ten years now. She came to Turkey in 1998 as a tourist, one year after 
her husband migrated. She flew to Antalya via Moscow, as she was told 
entry with a tourist visa through this southern border, also a promi-
nent vacation resort, would be easier. (They had previously made an 
unsuccessful attempt to enter via Batum, the northeastern border, 
the entire journey lasting fourteen days.) In Antalya, she was harassed 
by one of the border officials, who said, "Well I can't let you go with-
out a cup of tea. What folly to leave such a beautiful woman and her 
children unattended." Nurcihan said she cannot forget the face of 
that officer, and neither can she forget the officer who in the end 
helped her enter. Thus, crossing the border as a tourist in 1998, Nur-
cihan then overstayed her visa. 
When their younger child began attending school in Istanbul, 
Nurcihan settled with her family in the decrepit migrant settlements 
in an outer Istanbul suburb that hosts a low-income population inter-
spersed with middle-class residents of the newly built gated communities 
throughout the area. The migrant settlements had been commissioned 
for the earlier wave of 1989 migrants, many of whom were able to move 
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into better residences and left the migrant settlements vacant. Nurci-
han and her husband were able to legalize their status in 2001, when 
the Turkish state granted a three-month residence permit for free for 
those Bulgarian immigrants who overstayed their visas. This amnesty 
was given in return for voting in the Bulgarian general elections in 
which Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), the party that by 
and large represents the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, is a major con-
tender.40 This permit was nonrenewable, lasting only three months. 
Unable to renew their permit, Nurcihan and her husband turned to 
the new flexible visa regime which came into effect also in 2001 and 
which allowed them to stay in Turkey on visa waivers valid for three 
months. Then, due to a change in the law which requires a valid res-
idence permit for their children to attend Turkish schools, they were 
obliged to switch to the special residence permit, called the refakatfi 
izni, to which they are entitled as the companions of their children. 
Although they annually renewed this refakatfi izni from 2004 to 2007, 
they still were not qualified to apply for citizenship as the standard 
residence permit would have allowed and were not allowed to apply 
for a work permit, either. In October 2007, when a similar amnesty 
was granted in return for voting in the elections in Bulgaria, this time 
for six months, they switched back to the standard resident permit. 
However, when at the end of six months, no one who took advantage 
of the amnesty was able to renew their residence permits as expected, 
Nurcihan and her husband switched back yet again to the refakatfi 
permit. "All those ten years, all that effort we spent, must count for 
something," Nurcihan said. "I, too, want to pay taxes; I want to be a 
citizen . . . I don't want my children to take the Foreign Student Exam 
to enter the university, even if that means they will have to work 
harder like everyone else for the national university entrance exams." 
Dismissing the option of going back to Bulgaria on the grounds that her 
children have been educated in Turkey and no longer speak Bulgar-
ian, Nurcihan pointed to the huge map of Turkey plastered on the 
wall in their living room. "We did not put this map here for nothing," 
she said, "We live here now and my children are more familiar with 
this country than anywhere else." Currently with a standing applica-
tion for citizenship filed with the Ministry of Interior more than a 
year ago, Nurcihan is adamant in her desire to obtain Turkish citi-
zenship, and, if possible, to legally practice chemistry, her true pro-
fession, in Turkey. 
Aysel 
Aysel has been working in Istanbul as a live-in nanny since 2006. She 
had initially come to Turkey with her husband and two children as 
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part of the forced migration wave in 1989, but returned to Bulgaria 
in less than a year, thereby foregoing the citizenship granted to the 
1989 migrants who stayed. She decided to migrate to Turkey again in 
order to save money for the wedding expenses of her daughter and 
the university expenses of her son. Until the visa regime change in 
May 2007, Aysel was subject to the flexible visa regime that has been 
in effect since 2001 and which allowed Bulgarian passport holders to 
enter the country legally with visa waivers valid for three months. 
From 2006 to 2007, therefore, Aysel kept her status legal by exiting 
and reentering the country every three months (although she lapsed 
into illegality for working without a permit). Once the May 2007 law, 
which allowed Bulgarian passport holders up to 90 days only within 
any six-month period, went into effect, she made an arrangement with 
another circular migrant from Bulgaria: They would both work for 
her current employer, rotating every three months. But when the free 
six-month residence permit was granted in return for voting in the 
elections, accompanied by semiofficial rumors that the resident per-
mits would be renewed, they terminated the rotation as it no longer 
appeared to be needed. However, as Aysel, along with all the other 
migrants in the same situation, was unable to renew the permit as 
hoped, she became once again subjected to the May 2007 agreement 
that allowed her only 90 days legal stay in Turkey within every six 
months. 
At this point Aysel decided to seek legal aid from the oldest and 
most established Balkan migrant association in Istanbul, the Balkan 
Turks Solidarity Association. The general secretary wrote up her pe-
tition to the Ministry of Interior for the renewal of the permit. When 
the official reply, technically due in three months, did not arrive, she 
was instructed by the association that she was now entitled to sue the 
ministry for not processing her claim. However the price demanded 
by the association for the service for Filing the court action, which 
would eventually open the path of filing for citizenship, was beyond 
affordable, exceeding five months of her wages. She therefore decided 
to wait instead for another amnesty or visa regime change, or go back 
to the rotation arrangement. In the meantime, she left for Bulgaria 
to oversee her daughter's wedding. Although she would have logically 
arranged this most recent trip in accordance with the 90-day regula-
tion, she ended up exiting more than 30 days late, which brings an 
exorbitant fine at the border. However, her employer bought her a 
plane ticket: During a previous trip when she had also overstayed, she 
had been able to exit without being subjected to the fines that her fel-
low migrants, who traveled by bus at the same time, had not been able 
to avoid. 
This time, however, the plane arrangement did not work and she 
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was both fined and not allowed to reenter for three months. After wait-
ing out the three months, Aysel returned to work, and once again 
lapsed into illegality after 90 days of stay. She has just filed an applica-
tion for an amnesty that was announced very recently in March 2009, 
giving Turkish migrants from Bulgaria less than one week to apply for 
one-year-long free residence permits. Like Aysel, thousands of irregu-
lar migrants who waited in the long queues in front of the Foreigners 
Department found out, however, that the amnesty only applied to an 
already determined list of 900 migrants who had previously filed an 
application. At the urging of another migrant association, she decided 
to file a petition to apply for the amnesty anyway, with the hope that 
the amnesty would be expanded to include all migrants who were cur-
rently subjected to the maximum 90 days of stay rule. 
The Everyday Manifestations of Law 
While each individual's story is unique, the previous portraits were se-
lected because they are representative of what we have found to be 
the two most common responses to the shifting visa regimes and acts 
of sovereignty on the part of the immigrants who share the predica-
ment of being labor migrants from Bulgaria to Turkey in the 1990s. 
Nurcihan's insistence on claiming exclusive belonging to Turkey rep-
resents one dominant strategy, while Aysel's prioritization of transna-
tional ties and mobility represents another. However, before analyzing 
in detail these two different responses to state policies, we first under-
score the commonalities in these narratives in terms of how the laws 
are manifested in the everyday lives of immigrants. 
Nurcihan and Aysel are two of the 700,000 Turkish immigrants 
from Bulgaria currently residing in Turkey, according to the records 
of the Balkan Turks Solidarity Association (BTSA), the biggest and 
most established Balkan migrant association in Istanbul. Included in 
this figure are those who hold dual citizenship (namely the 1989 po-
litical migrants from Bulgaria who were granted Turkish citizenship 
but the majority of whom also kept their Bulgarian citizenship); those 
with regular residence permits or with refakatçi izni like Nurcihan; cir-
cular migrants on visa waivers like Aysel; and illegal immigrants. Al-
ready this categorization, however, belies the complexity of how the 
law and legal categories get manifested in and translated into everyday 
experience and the systematic slippages that occur in that process. 
Nurcihan, for example, has been on a residence permit for accom-
panying a child since 2004. Yet this does not qualify her either for cit-
izenship or for a work permit. Her status is thus as the companion of 
a child, yet she lapses into illegality as someone who works informally 
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as a domestic. Similarly, although Aysel is legal in terms of her exits 
and entries as a circular migrant with a visa waiver valid for three 
months, she, too, lapses into illegality as a migrant worker, because 
she has to work without a permit. Both Aysel and Nurcihan occupy 
that gray zone between legality and illegality as people who enter 
(Aysel) and who reside in (Nurcihan) the country legally but who be-
come illegal as workers in the informal economy. Finally, the broken 
lines of il/legality are constantly crossed by Aysel, Nurcihan, and all 
those migrants without Turkish citizenship each time yet a new visa 
policy or amnesty comes into effect and gets enacted in arbitrary ways. 
Let us consider, for example, the most recent visa agreement 
signed in May 2007 between the Bulgarian and Turkish governments 
and which stipulated that Bulgarian passport holders are allowed to 
stay in Turkey legally for a maximum of 90 days in every six-month pe-
riod. News of the latest regulation spread by word of mouth through 
migrant networks and usually originated from those migrants who 
had been warned by border officials or bus drivers that a new law was 
to come into effect soon. Other migrants complained of not being 
able to access any information even at the border. Like Aysel, immi-
grants, who until then had been engaging in circular migration with 
three-month visa waivers, began to calculate the remaining days they 
had for legal stay in Turkey for that six-month cycle. The panic stirred 
by the new policy was further exacerbated by the fact that no one 
seemed to be certain as to how exactly the dates would be calculated, 
whether starting on the day the agreement came into force or start-
ing on the date of their last entry. Nor was it obvious how the fines 
were to be determined. While migrants complained about the lack of 
response to their inquiries with the Foreigners Department, a query 
the researchers placed at the information desk of the Istanbul na-
tional airport yielded only a partial answer: The fines would increase 
incrementally in proportion to the length of overstay. 
How the exact fines were calculated became apparent only after 
migrants began to cross the border. One of our respondents had 
heard from a customs officer that they knew through acquaintances 
that a day's extra stay cost 158 YTL (approximately $131 at the time) .41 
The journey undertaken by Kasli across the Turkish-Bulgarian border 
in September 2007, however, during the heyday of the new regula-
tion, showed that one day of overstay amounted to 275 YTL (approx-
imately $228 at the time).42 While such discrepancies in information 
obtained by the migrants do not necessarily provide evidence of arbi-
trariness in actual practice, we nonetheless highlight such discrepan-
cies precisely because such circulating, semiofficial rumors were the 
only information available until the actual border crossings began.43 
Another example of ambiguity concerned the discrepancy in the 
"day counts" calculated by the migrants and the counts procured by 
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the border officials, reinforcing the migrants ' percept ions of arbitrari-
ness. Hal ime, a 38-year-old migran t who had been working in Turkey 
for two years explained how she tried to calculate he r exit da te in 
order to avoid the fine: 
First we thought that those days that we spent back home [in Bul-
garia] were subtracted in calculating the 90 days. But then I heard 
from my sister that she was fined for what turned out to be a mis-
calculation. My sister had added on the days she had spent in Bul-
garia during that time, since we thought that those days would not 
count toward our allowed stay of 90 days. So I calculated the days I 
stayed in Istanbul once again, this time without subtracting the days 
I had spent in Bulgaria between July 28 and August 6, and I hit the 
road on the 88th day. But when I reached the Edirnekapi exit [which 
is only a 6-8 hour bus drive from Istanbul], the computer counted it 
as my 91st day. I had to pay the 275 YTL for that one extra day. 
Beyond all the confusion that resulted from lack of informat ion 
and clear guidelines, we ga the red evidence of actual d iscrepant f in-
ing practices at the bo rde r as well: We were told by the migrants that 
procedures varied also a m o n g the two main land exit points , Derekoy 
and Kapikule, with officials at the latter be ing m o r e lenient and ad 
hoc about enforcing the fines. F u r t h e r m o r e , at least for a while, an 
entirely different p rocedu re seemed to apply at the a i rpor t check-
points: Aysel was no t fined at all a l though she overstayed for almost a 
month , because her employer had decided to see if it would make a 
difference to buy Aysel's airfare and have he r exit that way. When a 
friend of Aysel's was t u r n e d back at the Kapikule bo rde r trying to 
enter a l though she had no t yet waited ou t he r 90 days, she b o u g h t a 
plane ticket encouraged by Aysel's exper ience , and was still in disbe-
lief that the officers at the passport control had merely glanced at h e r 
passport and said "Welcome to Turkey."44 
Finally Yasemin, a migrant who came to Turkey with he r family in 
1999 th rough smuggling networks bu t who current ly holds a refakatfi 
izni, poked fun at the nons t anda rd applications of the regulat ions, 
which she exper ienced no t at the bo rde r but at the Foreigners De-
par tment . "We were in the same q u e u e with this ne ighbor for a resi-
dence permit . He got fined and I did not . You know, I am a lady 
[ laughter] ." T h e g e n d e r e d dynamic that had delayed ent ry for Nur-
cihan resulted, in this instance, in exempt ion from fines for Yasemin. 
But in both instances, the arbitrary authori ty of the state, as embod-
ied in the bo rde r official who may or may not allow, manifests itself as 
an exercise in sovereignty that is simultaneously a manifestation of 
hegemonic masculinity. 
Meanwhile, no t all migrants took to the road when the new reg-
ulation was passed. Instead, some decided to risk lapsing into illegality 
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and to wait and see if an amnesty would be released before the elec-
tions in Bulgaria. After all, such amnesties had been passed in 2001 
and 2005, in both incidents right before the Bulgarian elections. 
Those who voted in the elections had been given resident permits re-
gardless of their prior (il)legal status. The official assumption here 
was that the migrants would cast their votes for the Movement of Rights 
and Freedoms Party (MRF). The general secretary of the Balkan Turks 
Solidarity Association (BTSA) proudly told us, for example, that they 
had been the ones to convince the state authorities to give the immi-
grants three-month resident permits in return for voting in the Bul-
garian general election in 2001.45 
Indeed, this time around, too, the amnesty was granted on Octo-
ber 10, 2007, just eighteen days before the general election in Bul-
garia. Ironically, however, the amnesty ended up covering only those 
who had overstayed after the maximum of ninety days and were thus 
in violation of the latest regulation. Therefore, only those migrants 
who lapsed into illegality were able to receive the six-month residence 
permits, while the ones who abided by the new law were not able to 
take advantage. Then, contrary to the rumors and a circular signed 
by the MRF, the six-month residence permits were not renewed.46 It 
turned out, therefore, that the amnesty only allowed a temporary pe-
riod of legalization for these migrants who, once again, went back to 
Bulgaria to "wait out" their 90 days, or decided to overstay and are 
hoping for another amnesty to be declared. 
Such arbitrariness, which our respondents perceive as peculiar to 
the Turkish state, is actually yet another manifestation of the "en-
abling" as well as the "corrupt" faces of neoliberal states more gener-
ally.47 The agency of the decisionmaker actually plays a double role 
here. On the one hand, some space is allowed the migrant for ma-
neuvering the rules of the sovereign. On the other hand, such ma-
neuvers remained as atomized acts that still work to reproduce the 
power of the sovereign over migrants whose right to collective action 
is not guaranteed by the law and who are not subjects in the law but 
only subject to it. 
Migrant Acts 
We have so far pointed out what all labor migrants from Bulgaria 
share in common in terms of their subjection to the shifting visa poli-
cies and the often arbitrary ways in which the state puts these into 
practice through its bureaucratic agents. Now we turn to the strategic 
ways in which immigrants respond to these policies and their arbitrary 
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applications. By focusing on the strategies undertaken by the migrants, 
we hope to locate possible resistances to the arbitrariness of sovereign 
power as well as the limits of such resistance. Some immigrants, espe-
cially those who migrated as a family, like Nurcihan, are adamant in 
their pursuit of citizenship because they are unequivocal in their in-
tention to settle in Turkey. Other migrants, like Aysel, however, do 
not necessarily view Turkey as their permanent place of settlement. 
Rather, they wish to secure themselves as well as possible against the 
arbitrariness of visa policies, and find that the periodic amnesties pro-
vide them some respite. These migrants, too, might pursue the citi-
zenship path, but in instrumental fashion. 
Currently, claiming "Turkishness" is the primary legal means of 
obtaining a residence permit which, if it is renewed for two subse-
quent years, grants the right to apply citizenship to those of "Turkish 
descent" in accordance with Article 5 of the Settlement Law. Yet filing 
an application with the Ministry of Interior in Ankara for the status of 
münferit göçmen, which is the term granted those immigrants of Turk-
ish descent, is not a transparent process, least of all for the irregular 
migrants whose knowledge of the law is scant and who are intimi-
dated by signing official documents for the obvious reason of being 
irregular. The BTSA is the one association which claims to be the pi-
oneer of providing "true" legal help to the post-1990s irregular mi-
grants, basing this claim primarily on the fact that the general secretary 
of the association holds a J.D. and a master's degree in international 
law. The general secretary compiles the applications on behalf of the 
migrants in return for a fee of 100YTL (approximately $83), dubbed 
a "donation."48 The petition sent to the Ministry of the Interior states 
that the applicant has a relative of the first or second degree who is a 
Turkish citizen (a valid national identity card of the said relative 
needs to be attached to the petition) and that the applicant must thus 
be given a residence permit in accordance with Article 5 of the 1934 
Settlement Law, as he or she is of 'Turkish descent and culture." Al-
though in theory Article 5 ought to provide sufficient grounds for ob-
taining a residence permit eventually followed by citizenship, the 
general secretary underlines that the decisions for the permit are a 
matter of politics rather than law, thus resulting in various inconsis-
tencies in practice. Still, he insists that compared to other ways to apply 
for a regular residence permit toward the acquisition of citizenship— 
such as through marriage or enrolling in school—the most likely one 
to work in practice for the post-1990s Bulgarian Turkish immigrants 
is to obtain the special status of münferit göçmen.49 Moreover, what makes 
these applications still a rational option for the migrants, according 
to the general secretary, is that even if the ministry does not grant the 
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permit, the migrants are still better off for having put in an applica-
tion: A standing application entitles them to a legal stay for an extra 
six months, after which they receive an official reply. 
The migrant association representatives, in their official commu-
nications, adopt a strict language of rights on behalf of the migrants 
and boast of having set their goal as nothing short of obtaining citi-
zenship for all the migrants from Bulgaria. The association grounds 
its claims on natural entitlement: As "ethnic kin" from the Balkans, 
the migrants are the bearers of the imperial legacy—the contempo-
rary inhabitants of territories once owned by the Ottoman Empire. 
The Turkish state is thus "indebted" to these migrants, in the associa-
tion's view, and granting citizenship would be an evident way to repay 
the debt. However, despite this nationalist discourse, the legal coun-
seling provided by the association secretary also recognizes the arbi-
trariness of the process of applying for citizenship and explicitly 
exploits that arbitrariness by pointing out that even if they do not end 
up receiving citizenship, the migrants work the system to their ad-
vantage simply by applying. 
It is precisely in this strategic fashion that Aysel has filed a peti-
tion via the association to be recognized as a munferit gdcmen. She hopes 
the result will be positive so she can receive citizenship, which will en-
able her to come and go whenever she pleases instead of continuing 
to be subjected to the changing visa regimes. Yet Aysel would also set-
tle for the second option of filing repeated applications, even if each 
application gets rejected so that she can keep "earning" the right to 
an extra legal stay of six months in addition to the 90 days allowed by 
the current visa regime. Aysel is pursuing the possibilities for citizen-
ship not because she intends to settle but simply for the convenience 
of work and travel. She has no qualms about stating that she works in 
Turkey to save money for her family back home and makes no plans 
for permanent settlement. Instead she makes short-term calculations 
about overstays and fines based on the dictates of everyday life back 
home; whether, for example, she will have saved up enough money 
for the last piece of furniture for her daughter's wedding trousseau 
within the legal period of stay allowed to her. The fact that Aysel ma-
neuvers the system as best befits her cost-benefit calculations suggests 
that she does not aspire to becoming the ideal political subject like 
the 1989 immigrants or those who were granted munferit gdcmen status. 
Unlike Aysel, who primarily constitutes herself as an economic 
body, Nurcihan's self-representation is predicated on the declaration 
of national belonging. Through the applications she has filed with 
the Ministry of Interior, Nurcihan engages in legal proclamations of 
allegiance to the Turkish state as a prospective citizen, one who is wor-
thy of the status as someone of Turkish descent. In addition to the 
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particular course of legal action she takes, her commitment to the 
Turkish state is "on display" on an everyday basis through the map of 
Turkey hanging on her living room wall. She also discursively reiter-
ates her loyalty to Turkey in her exchanges with us: She repeatedly 
emphasizes her wish to pay taxes; her preference that her son takes 
the national university entrance exams to although the latter is harder 
than the foreigners exams; and her lack of interest in ever returning 
to Bulgaria. Unlike Aysel, who engages in circular migration and 
whose relationship to Turkey is transient, Nurcihan has settled in the 
migrant residences with her family. She intends to pursue all it takes 
to render her stay permanent and struggles to establish her "worth" 
as a political subject through the law and through everyday discursive 
acts. Ultimately, however, Aysel and Nurcihan's stories converge once 
again on the broken line of il/legality: Regardless of their respective 
motives and strategies, neither has been able to legalize her work and 
residence status permanently. 
Conclusion 
We have argued that migrants are systematically kept at the edges of 
legality in ways that best serve the political and the economic interests 
of the state. Each encounter with sovereign authority thus ends up 
creating a different form of subjection for the migrants. We have also 
tried to show that migrants instrumentalize these encounters for their 
own purposes as well. However, they seem to succeed only to the ex-
tent that these attempts are ultimately compatible with the interest of 
the sovereign that continues to wield the power to define the states-
of-exception. On the one hand, migrants develop tactics to negotiate 
the changing conditions of il/legality, since, recalling our opening 
metaphor, the boundaries of legality/illegality are constituted not as 
continuous but as broken lines rendering the legal lanes transpass-
able. On the other hand, because it is the sovereign state that lays 
down the rules of the flow, the individual strategies end up repro-
ducing the power of the state, which reaffirms the tenuous legal sta-
tus of the immigrants on the edge of being the exceptions to the rule. 
Various scholars have pointed to the ways in which the legal sta-
tus of immigrants is rendered temporary and that this temporariness 
is sustained by the state.50 At the economic level, the broken lines of 
il/legality that the immigrants are constantly made to cross, work to 
ensure a vulnerable labor force without the security of proper docu-
ments and who therefore are always disposable. We have also argued, 
however, that the further twist in the case of immigrants from Bulgaria 
is the added political dimension: The Turkish state keeps immigrants 
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in a p e r m a n e n t state of except ion by m e a n s of t empora ry per iods of 
legalization in o rder to encourage t h e m to vote in the Bulgarian elec-
tions. In contrast to the legal processes of ha rmoniza t ion with the 
Schengen acquis, which regulates and defines the limits to the move-
ment of persons not only a m o n g m e m b e r states bu t also to and from 
third countries , the Turkish state politically ex tends its realm of sov-
ereignty in a move toward what Basch et al. have called the "deterri-
torialised nation-state."51 In that sense, "globalization of domest ic 
politics," which is usually perceived as a bot tom-up mobilization,5 2 also 
works as a top-down political tool, as evidenced in the Turkish state's 
policies to encourage immigrants ' political involvement in Bulgaria 
th rough voting. It is also th rough such t ransnat ional ties and transna-
tional political practices, therefore, that the neoliberal sovereign repro-
duces its economic and political power by this par t icular instance of 
"inclusive exclusion." 
Finally we have suggested that the state of temporar iness , rein-
forced th rough the constant redefinit ion of the " threshold in life that 
distinguishes and separates what is inside from what is outside," is no t 
limited to acts of bo rde r crossing. T h e separat ion of the rights of m a n 
from the rights of citizens within nation-states cont inues to keep the 
migrants in a p e r m a n e n t state of except ion as the subjects to the law 
but no t the subjects in the law.53 T h e Turkish state rei terates its power 
of the decision to i n c l u d e / e x c l u d e th rough the f requent changes in 
the visa regimes and th rough r ende r ing citizenship difficult for these 
immigrants. T h e immigrants , on the o the r h an d , try to take advan-
tage of the except ions to the rule as best as they can, such as the tem-
porary amnesties or the arbitrary practices of the state agents or by 
hailing the münferit göçmen status with reference to their e thnona -
tional identity. Yet such privileged t reatments toward Bulgarian Turkish 
immigrants as except ions to the general visa policies are also them-
selves constantly subject to change . There fore , the b roken line of i l / 
legality seems to be prefer red by the sovereign state over p e r m a n e n t 
legality, which for the immigrants , becomes the t rue except ion to the 
"exceptions to the rule ." 
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